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"ABRIDGE" TOO FAR: RACIAL 
GERRYMANDERING, THE FIFTEENTH 
AMENDMENT, AND SHAW V. RENO 
N. JAY SHEPHERD* 
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied 
ar abridged . .. on account of race . ... 1 
Racial classifications of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm to 
our society. They reinfarce the beliif. . . that individuals should 
be judged by the color of their skin. Racial classifications with 
respect to voting carry particular dangers. Racial gerrymandering, 
even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us into competing racial 
factions; it threatens to carry us further from the goal of a political 
system in which race no longer matters-a goal that the Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendments embody, and to which the Nation 
continues to aspire. 2 
The joke goes that if you were to drive "down the interstate with 
both car doors open, you'd kill most of the people in the district."3 The 
interstate is 1-85, the district is North Carolina's Twelfth Congressional 
District, and most of the people in the driver's way would be black.4 
But to the voters of North Carolina, black and white, this is no joke; 
this is the product of the Supreme Court's approach to racial gerry-
mandering.5 
Gerrymandering is the drawing of electoral districts to benefit or 
disadvantage a particular group.6 The district at issue in Shaw v. Reno, 
* Managing Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL. 
1 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. For the full text of the Fifteenth Amendment, see infra note 
15. 
2 Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2832 (1993). 
3 Joan Biskupic, N. C. Case to Pose Test of Racial Redistricting; White Voters Challenge Black-Ma-
jority Map, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 1993, at A4. The joke, which is cited by the Supreme Court in 
Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2821, was relayed in the Washington Post article by North Carolina State 
Representative Mickey Michaux. Biskupic, supra, at A4. 
4 Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2820-21. 
5 Representative Michaux, a black politician, is among those who question whether a district 
like this actually weakens the political power of blacks. Biskupic, supra note 3, at A4. 
6 See, e.g., Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2823; Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, The Third Criterion: 
Compactness as a Procedural Safeguard Against Partisan Gerrymandering, 9 YALE L. & POL'y REv. 
301,301 (1991). For a more detailed discussion of the definition and purposes of gerrymander-
ing, see infra part II.A-B. 
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North Carolina's Twelfth, was drawn expressly for the purpose of 
creating a second congressional district where blacks constituted a 
majority of the population.7 Because the 1990 census revealed that 
approximately twenty percent of North Carolina's voting-age popula-
tion was black, the Attorney General of the United States required that 
two of the state's twelve representatives be black.8 To ensure this result, 
the legislature redrew the electoral map to create a second black-ma-
jority district, which became District 12.9 In order to comprise a black 
majority, the district extends for 160 miles in a serpentine fashion, 
winding through ten different counties '''until it gobbles in enough 
enclaves of black neighborhoods."'lo At times it is no wider than the 
Interstate 85 corridor; in one instance, it intersects with two other 
districts at a single geometric point. ll 
In Shaw, the Supreme Court held that the Twelfth District was so 
irregularly shaped that it could only be viewed as an effort to segregate 
races for electoral purposes.12 The plaintiffs in the case were five resi-
dents of North Carolina, two from the Twelfth District and three from 
a neighboring district. 13 The plaintiffs, all of whom were white,14 sued 
state and federal officials claiming violations of the Fourteenth and 
7 Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2820. The legislature's original redistricting plan already contained one 
majority-black district. Id. 
8Id. 
9Id. The drawing of the Twelfth District had already been the subject of an earlier lawsuit. 
Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392 (W.D.N.C.), aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 30 (1992). In Pope, the North Carolina 
Republican Party alleged that the district was an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander, drawn 
to benefit incumbent Democrats. The lower court dismissed the case, and the Supreme Court 
affirmed the dismissal. Id. For a discussion of the different types of gerrymandering, see infra 
part IIA. 
10 113 S. Ct. at 2820-21 (quoting Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 476 (E.D.N.C. 1992) 
(Voorhees, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), rev'd sub nom. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. 
Ct. 2816 (1993)). 
II Id. at 2821. 
12 Id. at 2832. 
13Id. at 2821. 
14The Court noted that nowhere in their claim did the plaintiffs indicate their race. Id. at 
2824. The district court had noted this as well, calling it "puzzling." Shaw, 808 F. Supp. at 470. 
The lower court took judicial notice of the plaintiffs' race, calling it "critical" to their claim. Id. 
In doing so, however, the court admitted that it may have been performing a disservice to the 
plaintiffs' intentions and legal cause. Id. In the sentence immediately following the judicial notice, 
the court stated that "[c]onstrued as a challenge by white voters ... the complaint fails to state 
a legally cognizable claim." Id. 
While the majority of the Court decided the case without referring to the plaintiffs' race, 
the dissenting members incorporated that factor in their opinions. See Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2838 
(White,]., dissenting) ("to discriminate against members of the majority group"); id. at 2843 
(Blackmun,]., dissenting) ("a challenge by white voters"); id. at 2847 n.6 (Souter,]., dissenting) 
("the difficulty the white plaintiffs would have here"). 
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Fifteenth Amendments. 15 The district court dismissed their case for 
failure to state a cognizable claim,16 and the Supreme Court noted 
probable jurisdiction.17 In a 5-4 decision written by Justice 0' Connor, 18 
the Court reasoned that state legislation that expressly distinguished 
citizens by race had to be narrowly tailored to further a compelling 
government interest. 19 The Court held that the Twelfth District was so 
bizarrely drawn that the only rational explanation was a desire to 
segregate voters by race.20 Because it was possible that such segregation 
violated the plaintiffs' equal protection rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment,21 the Court concluded that the plaintiffs had stated a 
cognizable claim.22 
The Court declined, however, to determine whether the district 
itself was an unconstitutional gerrymander.23 Although the majority 
15 808 F. Supp. at 468. 
The Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part: 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person 
oflife, liberty, or property, without due process oflaw; nor deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XN, § 1. For further discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment and its 
application to voting rights claims, see infra part III.B. The Fifteenth Amendment provides: 
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied 
or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude. 
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate 
legislation. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XV. For further discussion of the Fifteenth Amendment, its background, 
and cases decided under it, see infra part IILA. 
16 808 F. Supp. at 473. 
17 113 S. Ct. 653 (1992). 
18 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined the opinion of 
the Court. 113 S. Ct. at 2819. Justice White authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices 
Blackmun and Stevens. Id. at 2834. Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter each filed separate 
dissents as well. Id. at 2843, 2845. 
19 [d. at 2825. 
20 [d. at 2832. While it was clear that the intent of the North Carolina legislature was to create 
a second majority-black district, see id., the actual legislation was facially race neutral. Id. at 2828. 
21 [d. at 2828. The district court had ruled that the equal protection claim under the 
Fourteenth Amendment essentially subsumed the plaintiffs' Fifteenth Amendment claim. Id. at 
2822 (citing Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 468"'{)9 (E.D.N.C. 1992)). The Supreme Court 
apparently accepted this reasoning, for it declined to rule on the plaintiffs' Fifteenth Amendment 
claim. See id. at 2832. 
22 [d. 
23 [d. The Supreme Court traditionally attempts to avoid ruling on constitutional issues. See, 
e.g., City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 284 (1982) (noting Court's policy of 
avoiding unnecessary adjudication of federal constitutional questions). In Shaw, however, the 
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opinion is replete with antigerrymandering rhetoric, it fails to punctu-
ate this rhetoric with appropriate holdings. 24 Moreover, the Court took 
no position on the plaintiffs' Fifteenth Amendment claim,25 suggesting 
that the Fourteenth Amendment was more appropriate to the resolu-
tion of the case.26 This Note argues that the Supreme Court erred in 
failing to find North Carolina's racial gerrymander unconstitutional 
under the Fifteenth Amendment. Gerrymandering abridges the voting 
rights of the citizens affected by it. 27 Racial gerrymandering abridges 
these rights based on race. 28 The Fifteenth Amendment explicitly pro-
hibits the abridgement of the right to vote based on race. 29 Therefore, 
racial gerrymandering violates the Fifteenth Amendment. Although 
this case gave the Court the chance to resolve the question of race-
based redistricting, the Court instead left the issue unsettled.30 
Part II of this Note describes the theory and practice of gerryman-
dering, examining the various goals and methods of gerrymandering. 
Part III discusses the constitutionality of racial gerrymandering as 
Court ignored this policy by using the Equal Protection Clause to analyze the plaintiffs' claim. 
See Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824. 
24 Compare 113 S. Ct. at 2827 ("[Racial gerrymandering] bears an uncomfortable resem-
blance to political apartheid.") and id. at 2828 ("[Racial gerrymandering] reinforces racial 
stereotypes and threatens to undermine our system of representative democracy .... ") with id. 
at 2824 (calling ''wise'' the plaintiffs' concession that "race-conscious redistricting is not always 
unconstitutional") and id. at 2828 ("[W]e express no view as to whether 'the intentional creation 
of majority-minority districts, without more' always gives rise to an equal protection claim.") 
(citation omitted). 
25/d. at 2832. 
26 [d. at 2825-26. The Court noted with approvalJustice Whittaker's concurrence in Gomillion 
v. Lightfoot, the leading racial gerrymandering case decided under the Fifteenth Amendment. 
/d. (citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 349 (1960) (Whittaker,]., concurring)). Justice 
Whittaker suggested that that case should have been decided under the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. [d. The Shaw Court then concluded-incorrectly-that Gomillion 
stood for the proposition that racial gerrymandering violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Shaw, 
113 S. Ct. at 2826. For a more detailed discussion of Gomillion and the Fifteenth Amendment, 
see infra notes 108-13 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 61-65 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 260-65 and accompanying text. 
29 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1, supra note 15. 
30 See, e.g., Dave Kaplan, Constitutional Doubt is Thrown on Bizarre-Shaped Districts, 51 CONGo 
Q. WKLY. REP. 1761,1761 (1993) ("The Supreme Court onJune 28 invited a new wave oflawsuits 
challenging the constitutionality of districts drawn to ensure the election of minorities."); Carol 
M. Swain, Black Majority Districts, a Rotten Litmus Test, WALL ST.]., Dec. 27, 1993, at 6 (the Court 
in Shaw "left observers with no real standards with which to evaluate districting plans"); Gayle 
Pollard Terry, Perspective on Civil Rights; the True Concern is Racial justice, L.A. TiMES, July 27, 
1993, at B7 (interviewing Lani Guinier about Shaw V. Reno) ("What I find most disturbing about 
this court's opinion is that it seems uninterested in any remedy."). But cf Hays V. Louisiana, 839 
F. Supp. 1188, 1193 (W.D. La. 1993) ("[T]he roadmap sketched by the Court-as helpful as it 
is-leaves some questions to be answered in cases such as this."). 
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determined by the Supreme Court in the cases leading up to Shaw v. 
Reno. This section analyzes the two distinct currents of racial redistrict-
ing law under the Fifteenth and Fourteenth Amendments respectively. 
Part IV discusses Shaw, with an analysis of the majority and dissenting 
opinions. Finally, Part V applies the Fifteenth Amendment to Shaw and 
argues that all racial gerrymandering, whether "invidious" or "benign," 
is unconstitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment. 
II. GERRYMANDERING: THEORY AND PRACTICE 
A. Gerrymandering Defined 
Because gerrymandering is a term that conveys different mean-
ings and different connotations,31 a brief definitional discussion is in 
order. One dictionary defines the term as "to divide (an area) into 
political units in an unnatural and unfair way with the purpose of 
giving special advantages to one group."32 Some commentators limit 
the term to redistricting for a political party's advantage.33 This usage 
reflects the original meaning of the term, which was coined in 1812 to 
describe a Massachusetts district drawn to the advantage of Governor 
Elbridge Gerry's party.34 The term is commonly used today, however, 
to describe redistricting done for the advantage or disadvantage of a 
particular grou~partisan, racial, or otherwise.35 
This Note focuses on racial gerrymandering as opposed to parti-
san gerrymandering. Although the methods of gerrymandering are 
31 ELMER C. GRIFFITH, THE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERRYMANDER 15 (Arno Press 
1974) (1907). "The word gerrymander is one of the most abused words in the English lan-
guage .... It has been made the synonym for political inequality of every sort." Id. 
32WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 952 (1986) (second definition at 
"2gerrymander" entry). 
33 See, e.g., id. (first definition at "2gerrymander" entry) ("to divide (a territorial unit) into 
election districts ... with the purpose of giving one political party an electoral majority in a large 
number of districts"); DAVID BUTLER & BRUCE CAIN, CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING: COMPARA-
TIVE AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 158 (1992) (glossary) ("The drawing of constituency 
boundaries deliberately to secure party advantage."); GRIFFITH, supra note 31, at 21 ("the forma-
tion of election districts ... with boundaries arranged for partisan advantage"); Polsby & Popper, 
supra note 6, at 301 ("any manipulation of district lines for partisan purposes"). 
34 GRIFFITH, supra note 31, at 16-17. The district, located in northeastern Massachusetts, 
vaguely resembled a salamander: hence the term, combining Gerry's name with the word 
"salamander." See id. at 17. For a fuller discussion of the history of the term, see id. at 16-20. A 
note on pronunciation: while Governor Gerry's surname was pronounced with a hard g, the term 
gerrymander is more commonly pronounced with a soft g. See WEBSTER'S, supra note 32, at 952 
(entry at "lgerrymander"). 
35 See, e.g., ALEXANDER]. BOTT, HANDBOOK OF UNITED STATES ELECTION LAWS AND PRAC-
TICES 200 (1990); BUTLER & CAIN, supra note 33, at 33-34; Polsby & Popper, supra note 6, at 
301. 
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basically the same whether the groups affected are racial or partisan,36 
only racial gerrymandering presents a Fifteenth Amendment issue.37 
Political gerrymandering cases, which the Supreme Court only recently 
held as justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause,38 are beyond the 
scope of this Note.39 
B. Goals and Methods of Gerrymandering 
There are basically two gerrymandering techniques: "packing" 
and "cracking."40 Packing involves concentrating voters of a particular 
group into one district, thus assuring victory for the group in that 
district but defeat in the remaining districts.4l Suppose, for example, 
that a state has five districts, three controlled by Party A and two 
controlled by Party B. Suppose further that Party A controlled the 
redistricting process and wanted to weaken Party Bs electoral power. 
The districting authority could draw new boundaries so that most of 
the Party B voters were placed in the same district: District 1. Party B 
would have a supermajority in this district and would almost certainly 
win the seat. In each of the four remaining districts, however, Party A 
voters would vastly outnumber B voters, allowing Party A to easily win 
those seats. Because only a simple majority is required to win a district,42 
each B vote beyond the necessary majority in District 1 would be 
wasted.43 Packing is most effective when voters of the targeted group 
(Party B, in this example) are naturally dispersed.44 
When the targeted voters are already concentrated, the alternate 
technique of cracking is more effective. Cracking involves dispersing a 
36 Compare Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2840 (White,]., dissenting) (describing various methods of 
racial gerrymandering) with Polsby & Popper, supra note 6, at 303-04 (describing various meth-
ods of partisan gerrymandering). 
37 See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 V.S. 339, 346 (1960). 
38 Davis v. Bandemer, 478 V.S. 109 (1986). 
39 For a full discussion of partisan gerrymandering, see generally Polsby & Popper, supra note 
6, and Stephen]. Thomas, The Lack of Judicial Direction in Political Gerrymandering: An Invitation 
to Chaos Following the 1990 Census, 40 HASTINGS LJ. 1067 (1989). 
40 See Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2840 (White,]., dissenting); Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149, 
1155 (1993); Michael D. McDonald & Richard L. Engstrom, Detecting Gerrymandering, in POLITI-
CAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS 178, 178-79 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1990); Polsby & 
Popper, supra note 6, at 303-04. "Stacking," another contribution to prosody by political scientists, 
has various and conflicting meanings, and will not be addressed in this Note. Compare Shaw, 113 
S. Ct. at 2840 (White,]., dissenting) (defining "stacking" as burying a large minority population 
within a larger white population) with Polsby & Popper, supra note 6, at 303 (equating "stacking" 
with "packing"). 
41 Voinovich, 113 S. Ct. at 1155; McDonald & Engstrom, supra note 40, at 178-79. 
42 This example assumes a two-party system. 
43 See ANDREW HACKER, CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTING: THE ISSUE OF EQUAL REPRESENTATION 
55-57 (1986); McDonald & Engstrom, supra note 40, at 178-79. 
44 See Voinovich, 113 S. Ct. at 1155; McDonald & Engstrom, supra note 40, at 178-79. 
344 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:337 
particular group of voters throughout many districts so that they can-
not form a majority in any of the districts. 45 Using the above example, 
suppose Party B's voters were concentrated in the two easternmost 
districts, where they constituted comfortable majorities over Party A's 
voters. The districting authority, under Party A's control, could draw 
new boundaries so that B's voters were divided among all five districts. 
In each district, Party A's voters would form a majority and would win 
the seat. 46 
Gerrymandering is far more complicated than these examples 
suggest, as the districting authority must consider many demographic, 
geographic, and political factorsY In response to this complexity, leg-
islatures use computer technology to make gerrymandering easier and 
more efficient.48 Technological breakthroughs, mainly in computer 
software, now allow any interested group to feed demographic data 
into a personal computer and have the computer map out districts that 
suit the group's agenda.49 Data from the U.S. Census Bureau is now 
readily accessible by computer.50 The Bureau's Topologically Inte-
grated Geographic Encoding and Referencing (TIGER) system gives 
census information in a street-by-street format, allowing districting 
authorities to include or exclude people in fantastic detaipl Some 
commentators suggest that the new, high-technology methods of redis-
tricting remove the process from partisan politics.52 They reason that 
if technicians enter the data and computers make the mapping deci-
sions, the process involves no politics.53 Quite to the contrary, however, 
technological advances have made it more likely that politicians will 
draw districts for political gain. 54 The districting authority simply gives 
45 Voinuvich, 113 S. Ct. at 1155; McDonald & Engstrom, supra note 40, at 179. 
46 This is easier to visualize if the state is rectangular and was originally divided into five 
districts of equal size running east to west. Party B's voters are concentrated in the easternmost 
two districts. If the redistricting created five rectangular districts, each running the length of the 
state from east to west, Party B voters would constitute a minority in the eastern two fifths of each 
district. 
47 BUTLER & CAIN, supra note 33, at 65-66. 
48 See id. at 60-61; Gordon E. Baker, The Unfinished Reapportionment Revolution, in POLITICAL 
GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS, supra note 40, at 11,23. 
49 Beth Donovan, North Carolina Computer Draws Some Labyrinthine Lines, 49 CONGo Q. WKLY. 
REp. 1916,1916 (1991). For a discussion of technological advances in redistricting, see generally 
Arthur J. Anderson & William S. Dahlstrom, Technological Gerrymandering: How Computers Can 
Be Used in the Redistricting Process to Comply with Judicial Criteria, 22 URB. LAW. 59 (1990). 
50 See Donovan, supra note 49, at 1917; BUTLER & CAIN, supra note 33, at 60-61. 
5! BUTLER & CAIN, supra note 33, at 60. 
52 Anderson & Dahlstrom, supra note 49, at 76. 
53Id. But see BUTLER & CAIN, supra note 33, at 64 ("Redistricting choices are about more 
than mere numbers and shapes-they concern political power, fairness, and values of repre-
sen tation. ") . 
54 See Polsby & Popper, supra note 6, at 303. 
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its desired criteria-such as more blacks or fewer Democrats-to the 
technicians, who program the computers accordingly.55 As the follow-
ing section will demonstrate, making gerrymandering more efficient 
does not make it more democratic. 
C. Gerrymandering and the Alrridgement of Voters' Rights 
Throughout our nation's history, state legislatures-primarily in 
the South-have employed various means to disenfranchise blacks.55 
Initially, franchised whites resorted to violence and other direct means 
to deny blacks their right to vote.57 Later, they used indirect and 
ostensibly neutral methods such as multimember districts and grand-
father clauses to abridge the voting rights of black citizens.58 One such 
method was racial gerrymandering, where officials redrew electoral 
districts using race as the primary criterion.59 In Mississippi, for exam-
ple, the anti-Reconstruction legislature once drew a "shoestring" con-
gressional district that segregated most of the area's black voters, guar-
anteeing white majorities in the five surrounding districts.50 
Gerrymandering abridges the rights of the affected voters by tak-
ing away a portion of their ability to select their representatives. 51 A 
simple hypothetical will demonstrate this fact: in an unger ryman de red 
congressional district, voters determine the result of an election them-
selves. Although a candidate is subject to certain legal qualifications, 
such as age and citizenship restrictions, no other person or body has 
any say over which candidate is elected. The voters of this district 
55 Anderson & Dahlstrom, supra note 49, at 76-77. 
56 Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2823 (1993); RICHARD BARDOLPH, THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
RECORD: BLACK AMERICANS AND THE LAW, 1849·1970, at 56-58 (1970); CAROL M. SWAIN, BLACK 
FACES, BLACK INTERESTS: THE REPRESENTATION OF AFRICAN AMERICANS IN CONGRESS 27-28 
(1993). 
57 BARDOLPH, supra note 56, at 57-58. Techniques ranged from the obvious (such as stealing 
ballot boxes) to the ingenious (such as giving black voters ballots printed on tissue paper, which 
a blindfolded official fished out after counts showed "too many" votes cast). [d. at 58. 
58 See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 616-17 (1982) (multimember districts held 
unconstitutional where they dilute minority voting power); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 
368 (1915) (grandfather clauses that dilute minority voting power held unconstitutional). 
In a multimember district, voters elect two or more representatives to the legislature. Such 
a district comprises what would normally be two or more single·member districts. The candidates 
with the highest vote tallies win. Because the majority chooses all the winning candidates, the use 
of multimember districts tends to decrease the voting strength of minorities. For a more detailed 
discussion of multimember districts, see generally BOTT, supra note 35, at 204-07. For a discussion 
of grandfather clauses, see infra notes 98-104 and accompanying text. 
59 See Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2823; Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960). 
60 Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2823 (quoting ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED 
REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at 590 (1988». This gerrymander used the same packing technique as 
the example in part n.B above. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text. 
61 See Polsby & Popper, supra note 6, at 304; see also Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 347. 
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possess 100% of the power to choose which candidate will win; no 
other person or government body can affect the election's outcome.62 
Compare this situation to an election in which a person or author-
ity seeking partisan gain has drawn the districts. Gerrymandering will 
influence the outcome of this election to a certain extent-we can 
label this extent as X%, where X is a certain percentage of the total 
power to determine the election's result. Instead of having 100% of 
the power to determine the outcome of the election, the voters now 
have 100% minus X% or (100 - X) % of this power. As the effectiveness 
of the gerrymander (X%) increases, the influence of the actual voters 
(100 - X) % decreases. Gerrymandering, therefore, reduces the power 
of voters to choose their representatives. 
Article I of the Constitution requires that members of the House 
of Representatives be chosen "by the People."63 The Supreme Court 
has held that this clause grants qualified citizens a constitutional right 
to vote. 64 By taking power away from the electorate through gerryman-
dering, the districting authority abridges the voting rights of each 
individual voter.65 
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RACIAL GERRYMANDERING 
Having examined the theory and practice of gerrymandering in 
general, this Note now focuses on the constitutionality of redistricting 
by race. The Supreme Court has followed two different paths in its 
adjudication of racial gerrymandering and vote dilution cases: one 
utilizing the Fifteenth Amendment, and the other using the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because the Fif-
teenth Amendment specifically covers race and the right to vote, we 
will first consider that amendment and the cases decided under it:. 
62 An excellent example of this can be found in the election of the representative in a 
single-district state, such as Alaska. No one can gerrymander the candidate's district because it 
encompasses the entire state-there are no district lines to manipulate. Although there are 
constitutional and legal prerequisites, such as American citizenship and being at least twenty-five 
years of age, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, d. 2, no districting authority can redraw district lines to 
benefit or disadvantage a particular group or candidate. The voters of Alaska therefore possess 
100% of the power to choose their representative. 
63 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1. 
64 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554 (1964); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884). 
65 See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555. The Court in Reynolds stated: 
The right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is of the essence of a 
democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of repre-
sentative government. And the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or 
dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting 
the free exercise of the franchise. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
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A. The Fifteenth Amendment 
1. Background and Passage 
The most enduring results of the Civil War were the Thirteenth,66 
Fourteenth,67 and Fifteenth68 Amendments to the Constitution, which 
sought to abolish slavery and eliminate its effects.69 The scope of the 
Thirteenth Amendment was limited to fulfilling the Union's war aim 
of ending slavery.7o By contrast, the Fourteenth Amendment had the 
much broader purpose of federalizing and constitutionalizing political 
rights.71 One of the rights the Framers of this Amendment sought to 
protect was the right to vote. 72 Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
threatened states with reduced representation in Congress if they failed 
to extend the franchise to blacks.73 This section, written by northern 
Republicans, was not self-executing.74 Because Congress failed to im-
plement this provision with enforcement legislation, the section 2 
weapon for compelling black suffrage was never used.75 
The relatively weak language regarding suffrage in the Fourteenth 
Amendment was a result of the Republicans' tenuous hold on Congress 
66The full text of the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery, reads as follows: 
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for 
a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the 
United States or any place subject to their jurisdiction. 
Section 2. Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate 
legislation. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
67 See supra note 15. 
68 See supra note 15. 
69 See D. Grier Stephenson, Jr., The Supreme Coort, the Franchise, and the Fifteenth Amendment: 
The First Sixty Years, 57 UMKC L. REv. 47, 48-49 (1988). 
70 See U.s. CONST. amend. XIII; see also EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, 
AND CONGRESS, 1863--1869, at 13-14 (1990); Stephenson, supra note 69, at 48-49. 
71 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see also RICHARD CLAUDE, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ELECTORAL PROCESS 45 (1970); Stephenson, supra note 69, at 48-49. 
72 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2, which reads as follows: 
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States accord-
ing to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each 
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election ... 
is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of 
age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, ... the basis of 
representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of 
such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years 
of age in such State. 
[d. See CLAUDE, supra note 71, at 50-51; Stephenson, supra note 69, at 49. 
73 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
74 See CLAUDE, supra note 71, at 50. 
75 [d. at 50-51. 
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and the White House at the time of the Amendment's passage.76 Be-
cause a more powerful provision might have doomed the passage of 
the entire Amendment, the Republicans decided not to insist on black 
suffrage.77 Mter the Republicans nearly lost their majority in the 1868 
congressional elections, however, they determined that the benefits of 
granting suffrage to blacks (who would likely vote Republican) out-
weighed the risk of losing the support of some white voters. 78 
The Fifteenth Amendment originated as a variety of Republican 
proposals in both chambers of Congress,79 with the sharpest division 
over whether to limit the Amendment to suffrage or to include a right 
to hold elective office as well.so As proposals gained support on Cap~tol 
Hill, Republicans in the two chambers took opposite sides of this 
division, with the more liberal Senate favoring the broader provision.81 
In conference committee, the House backers forced the Senate to drop 
the officeholding provision and adopt the more restrained language 
found in the final form of the Amendment.82 On February 26, 1869, 
the Senate passed the House version of the Amendment and sent it to 
the states for ratification.83 Within just over a year, three fourths of the 
states ratified the Amendment, making it part of the federal Constitu-
tion.84 Under the language of the Amendment, states were no longer 
allowed to deny or abridge the voting rights of citizens based on race. 85 
2. Fifteenth Amendment Cases 
In spite of the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment and the 
presence of federal troops in the South, many southerners actively 
76 Stephenson, supra note 69, at 49-50. 
77 See MALTZ, supra note 70, at 89-90; Stephenson, supra note 69, at 49. 
78 Stephenson, supra note 69, at 50. Ironically, the Republicans were more concerned with 
obtaining suffrage for blacks in the North, rather than in the South. The Reconstruction Act of 
1867 made suffrage for blacks in southern states a condition for reentry into the Union. 14 Stat. 
428 (1867). While a constitutional amendment would permanently guarantee suffrage for south-
ern blacks, it would also grant suffrage to blacks in all northern states, which were not subject to 
the Reconstruction Act. See WILLIAM GILLETTE, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: POLITICS AND PASSAGE OF 
THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 46 (1969); Stephenson, supra note 69, at 50. Presumably, the 
northern blacks would then align themselves with the Republican Party. GILLETTE, supra, at 46. 
79 See MALTZ, supra note 70, at 146;JOHN M. MATHEWS, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY 
OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 22-23 (1909); Stephenson, supra note 69, at 51. 
80 MALTZ, supra note 70, at 147; GILLETTE, supra note 78, at 59. 
81 CLAUDE, supra note 71, at 52. 
82 Id.; U.S. CaNST. amend. XV, § 1. 
83 See MATHEWS, supra note 79, at 34; CONGo GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1641 (1869). 
84GILLETTE, supra note 78, at 81; MATHEWS, supra note 79, at 75. 
85 U.S. CaNST. amend. XV, § 1, supra note 15. 
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undermined black suffrage.86 When the Compromise of 1877 removed 
the troops from the former Confederacy and signaled the end of 
Reconstruction, the federal government had effectively abandoned the 
goals of black suffrage.87 Southern whites employed fraud, violence, 
and various electoral schemes (such as at-large elections and racial 
gerrymandering) to disenfranchise blacks.88 Although the Fifteenth 
Amendment is self-executing,89 Congress began to combat disenfran-
chisement by using the enforcement power granted it by section 2.90 
For example, the Enforcement Act of 187091 established criminal pen-
alties for intimidating voters,92 and the Civil Rights Act of 187593 pro-
vided for social rights as well as political rights.94 The enforcement 
legislation was soon eviscerated, however, by unfavorable Supreme 
Court decisions narrowly construing the Fifteenth Amendment.95 After 
these setbacks, Congress eschewed further civil rights legislation for 
more than eight decades.96 During this period, hope for advancing 
black suffrage through Congress and the Supreme Court faded. 97 
Not until 1915 did the Fifteenth Amendment win its first major 
Supreme Court victory: Guinn v. United States.98 In that case, the Court 
held that a "grandfather clause" that deprived illiterate blacks of the 
right to vote was unconstitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment.99 
86 See BARDOLPH, supra note 56, at 57; Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief 
HistlffY, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING 7, 10 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson 
eds., 1992). 
87 See BARDOLPH, supra note 56, at 57; Davidson, supra note 86, at 10. 
88BARDOLPH, supra note 56, at 57; Davidson, supra note 86, at 10. 
89 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 u.S. 301, 325 (1966) (section 1 "has always been treated 
as self-executing"); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 363 (1915) ("the command of the 
Amendment was self-executing"); see also GILLETTE, supra note 78, at 162; MATHEWS, supra note 
79, at 76-77; EmmaC.]ordan, The Future of the Fifteenth Amendment, 28 How. LJ. 541, 542 (1985). 
But see J. Morgan Kousser, The Voting Rights Act and the Two Reconstructions, in CONTROVERSIES 
IN MINORITY VOTING, supra note 86, at 135, 136-37 & n.6 (suggesting that it was "naive to believe 
that the right to vote was self-executing ... as some scholars carelessly charge"). 
90 See CLAUDE, supra note 71, at 54; MATHEWS, supra note 79, at 79;]ordan, supra note 89, 
at 549; Kousser, supra note 89, at 138-39. 
91 16 Stat. 140 (1870) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1993». 
92 See CLAUDE, supra note 71, at 54. 
93 18 Stat. 335 (1875). 
94 See generally BARDOLPH, supra note 56, at 54. For a discussion of these and other attempts 
at early civil rights legislation, see id. at 45-72. 
95 See, e.g., United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876) (declaring unconstitutional key provi-
sions of the Enforcement Act of 1870); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (declaring 
unconstitutional key provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1875). 
96 See BARDOLPH, supra note 56, at 72. 
97 See id. at 72, 144. 
98 238 U.S. 347 (1915). 
99 Id. at 367. 
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An amendment to the Oklahoma Constitution included a provision 
that required a literacy test for voters; an exception was made, however, 
for people who either had had the franchise on January 1, 1866, or 
were directly descended from such people. 100 Because this date pre-
ceded the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment, the only people cov-
ered by the grandfather clause were white males.101 Consequently, the 
law required blacks to pass a literacy test before gaining the franchise, 
whereas whites were exempt.102 The Court reasoned that despite the 
lack of explicit racial language in the grandfather clause, the purpose 
of the clause was to circumvent the rights guaranteed by the Fifteenth 
Amendment. 103 Because the Fifteenth Amendment is self-executing, 
the Supreme Court could render the Oklahoma provision void without 
congressional action. 104 
Following this important precedent, the Supreme Court invoked 
the Fifteenth Amendment in a handful of cases to nullify other prac-
tices designed to undermine black suffrage. 105 As this line of jurispru-
dence developed, the Court examined disenfranchisement methods of 
increasing complexity and sophistication. 106 The Court maintained that 
the Fifteenth Amendment also covered these methods: "The Amend-
ment nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of dis-
crimination. It hits onerous procedural requirements which effectively 
handicap exercise of the franchise by the colored race although the 
abstract right to vote may remain unrestricted as to race. "107 
In 1960, in Gomillion v. Lightfoot,I°8 the Supreme Court applied 
the Fifteenth Amendment in holding unconstitutional one of the 
most sophisticated disenfranchisement techniques: racial gerryman-
dering. lOg The Alabama legislature had redrawn the boundaries of the 
city of Tuskegee, changing its shape from a square to an "uncouth 
100 Id. at 357. 
101Id. at 364-65. 
102 Id. at 362. 
103Id. at 364-65. 
104 Id. at 363. 
105 See, e.g., Davis v. Schnell, 336 U.S. 933 (1949) (requiring prospective voters to show that 
they could "understand and explain" constitutional articles in order to register violates Fifteenth 
Amendment); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (Texas whites-only primaries violate Fif-
teenth Amendment); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939) (Oklahoma literacy test for blacks not 
grandfathered under statute violates Fifteenth Amendment); Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 
(1915) (Maryland grandfather clause violates Fifteenth Amendment). 
106 See Adam J. Chill, The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments with Respect to the Voting 
Franchise: A Constitutional Quandary, 25 COLUM.J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 645, 650 (1992). 
107 Lane, 307 U.S. at 275. 
108 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.s. 339, 347 (1960). 
109 Id. at 347. 
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twenty-eight-sided figure. "110 The effect of this alteration was to remove 
from the city all but four or five of Tuskegee's black residents, while 
retaining every single white resident. lll In striking down the scheme, 
the Court reasoned that the special discriminatory treatment of black 
voters violated the Fifteenth Amendment by denying them their right 
to vote in the city.ll2 
Unlike in later cases, the Court in Gomillion applied only the 
Fifteenth Amendment to the racial gerrymandering. ll3 In Wright v. 
lWckejeller,l14 the Court used both the Fifteenth and the Fourteenth 
Amendments in determining that a congressional redistricting was not 
an unconstitutional gerrymander. l15 A New York statute had redrawn 
several Manhattan districts, removing minorities from one district and 
segregating them into another district. 116 While all the Justices agreed 
that the plaintiffs had stated a constitutional claim,117 they disagreed 
on whether the plaintiffs had proved their claim.11s The dissenters 
contended that the strangely shaped districts could only be explained 
in racial terms,119 while the majority felt that the plaintiffs had failed 
to meet their burden of proof.120 
Soon after the Supreme Court decided Wright, Congress passed 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965,121 which took its operative language 
110 [d. at 340. 
III [d. at 34l. 
112 [d. at 346. The Court also held that the issue was not a political question, despite the 
characterization of the redrawing of municipal boundaries as political. !d. at 346-47. "While in 
form this is merely an act redefining metes and bounds, ... the inescapable human effect of this 
essay in geometry and geography is to despoil colored citizens, and only colored citizens, of their 
theretofore enjoyed voting rights." [d. at 347. 
113 [d. at 346. In his concurrence, Justice Whittaker wrote that the Court should have used 
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause instead of the Fifteenth Amendment to 
decide this case. [d. at 349 (Whittaker,]., concurring). He argued that moving voters from one 
district to another did not abridge their right to vote, although it did involve a racial segregation 
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. [d. It is important to note that the Court adopted 
Justice Whittaker's reasoning in later cases as it abandoned Fifteenth Amendment adjudication 
of racial gerrymandering cases. See Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2826 (1993). 
114 376 U.S. 52 (1964). 
115 [d. at 56. 
116 [d. 
117 [d.; id. at 58 (Harlan,]., concurring); id. at 59-62 (Douglas,]., dissenting). 
118 [d. at 56-58; id. at 59 (Douglas,]., dissenting). 
119 [d. at 59 (Douglas,]., dissenting). 
120 [d. at 58. 
12l Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 
1973bb-l (1993». The Act required preclearance of all tests and barriers to voting in certain 
districts around the country, mostly in the South. Voting Rights Act § 5. Section 2 of the Act 
prohibited the use of any tests or other procedures designed to discriminate against minority 
voters. !d. § 2. The basis for the Act was the second section of the Fifteenth Amendment, which 
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directly from the Fifteenth Amendment. 122 The Supreme Court upheld 
the constitutionality of the Act in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 123 ruling 
that the Fifteenth Amendment supersedes discriminatory exertions of 
state power. 124 In that case, South Carolina had desired to change its 
election laws without following Voting Rights Act procedures. 125 The 
Court denied South Carolina's claim, reasoning that Congress had 
faithfully exercised its enforcement power under the second section of 
the Fifteenth Amendment. 126 
With the arrival of the Voting Rights Act and the Court's shift 
to Fourteenth Amendment adjudication of racial gerrymandering 
cases,127 the Fifteenth Amendment ceased to be an effective means of 
challenging racial vote dilution. 128 In 1980, the Court further marginal-
ized the Amendment by requiring that a plaintiff prove the existence 
of racially discriminatory intent to prevail in a Fifteenth Amendment 
challenge.129 In City of Mobile v. Bolden, black citizens challenged the 
city's at-large electoral system, charging that it violated the Fifteenth 
Amendment. 13o In a splintered plurality opinion, Justice Stewart con-
tradicted past interpretations of the Fifteenth Amendment by asserting 
that it concerned only acts of purposeful discrimination. l3l 
reserved to Congress the power to enforce the amendment with appropriate legislation. H.R. 
REp. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.CAN. 2437, 2437. 
122 Section 2 of the Act provides in pertinent part: 
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure 
shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which 
results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote 
on account of race or color . ... 
Voting Rights Act, § 2(a) (emphasis added); if. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1, supra note 15 
(citizens' right "to vote shall not be denied or abridged ... on account of race"); see Chill, supra 
note 107, at 654. 
123 383 U.S. 301 (1966). 
124Id. at 325. 
125Id. at 308. 
126Id. at 337; see U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2, supra note 15. 
127 See infra part III.B. 
128 See Emma C. Jordan, Taking Voting Rights Seriously: Rediscovering the Fifteenth Amendment, 
64 NEB. L. REV. 389,429 (1985). 
129 City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 65 (1980) (plurality opinion of Stewart,].). 
130 Id. at 58 (plurality opinion of Stewart, J.). The plaintiffs also charged that the scheme 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment Id. The Court required that 
the plaintiffs show evidence of purposeful discrimination to prevail in this claim. Id .. at 66 
(plurality opinion of Stewart,].) . 
In an at-large electoral system, each candidate runs citywide instead of running for individual 
wards. Each voter casts ballots for each of the council seats, rather than for just his or her own 
ward. Because the citywide majority chooses all the candidates, such a system tends to decrease 
the infl uence of minority groups. For a further discussion of at-large voting systems, see generally 
BOTT, supra note 35, at 2044)7. 
131 Mobile, 446 U.S. at 62 (plurality opinion of Stewart,].); see Jordan, supra note 128, at 428. 
Justice Stewart based his opinion, which only three other justices joined, on creative interpreta-
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In response to the Mobile decision,132 Congress passed the 1982 
amendments to the Voting Rights Act, articulating a results test instead 
of the Court's purposeful discrimination test. 133 The Supreme Court 
upheld the amended Act in Thornburg v. Gingles,134 putting to rest the 
Mobile notion that purposeful discrimination is a requirement for prov-
ing a Voting Rights Act violation. 135 The Court has yet to set aside, 
however, the Mobile plurality's holding that the Fifteenth Amendment 
applies only to acts of purposeful discrimination.136 The Supreme 
Court apparently believes that the Fifteenth Amendment is no longer 
an effective weapon for combatting the denial or abridgement of the 
right to vote, and favors instead the Voting Rights Act and the Equal 
Protection Clause.137 
B. Minority Vote Dilution and the Equal Protection Clause 
Justice Whittaker's concurrence in Gomillion v. Lightfoot foreshad-
owed the analysis that would dominate minority vote dilution cases in 
tions of Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915), Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), 
and Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964). Compare Mobile, 446 U.S. at 62 (characterizing 
Guinn as requiring discriminatory purpose to find a Fifteenth Amendment violation) with Guinn, 
238 U.S. at 365 (holding that a law with no rational purpose other than to deny or abridge a 
person's right to vote violates the Fifteenth Amendment); compare Mobile, 446 U.S. at 63 (char-
acterizing Gomillion as holding that "in the absence of such an invidious purpose, a State is 
constitutionally free to redraw boundaries in any manner it chooses") (emphasis added) with 
Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 347 ("While in form this is merely an act redefining metes and bounds, 
... the inescapable human effect of this essay in geometry and geography is to despoil colored 
citizens ... of their theretofore enjoyed voting rights.") (emphasis added); compare Mobile, 446 
U.S. at 63 & n.ll (characterizing Wright as supporting the principle that an invidious purpose 
must be adduced) with Wright, 376 U.S. at 56 (holding that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the 
legislature "was either motivated by racial consideration or in fact drew the districts on racial lines") 
(emphasis added). 
132S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 36, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177,214 (legislative 
history of 1982 amendments to Voting Rights Act). 
133pub. L. No. 97-205,1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. (96 Stat.) 134 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 
to 1973bb-1 (1993)). The amended Act provides in pertinent part: 
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the 
totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomina-
tion or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to partici-
pation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section 
in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to 
participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice .... 
Voting Rights Act, § 2(b) (as amended). 
134 478 U.S. 30 (1986); see infra notes 156-59 and accompanying text. 
135 478 U.S. at 43-44. 
136 See Jordan, supra note 128, at 392 & nn.6-7. 
137 See id. at 392; see also Shaw v. Reno, ll3 S. Ct. 2816, 2825-26 (1993) (asserting that 
Fourteenth Amendment review is more appropriate than the Fifteenth Amendment review used 
by the Court in Gomillion); Voinovich v. Quilter, ll3 S. Ct. ll49, ll58 (1993) (after upholding 
an Ohio redistricting plan under the Voting Rights Act, the Court finds no need to apply the 
Fifteenth Amendment to the case). 
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the years to follow. 138 In his opinion, Justice Whittaker argued that the 
Court should have used the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment instead of the Fifteenth Amendment to overturn the 
racial gerrymander. 139 The Gomillion Court was reluctant to use the 
Fourteenth Amendment because it had previously ruled that redistrict-
ing issues were non justiciable political questions. 14o The Court side-
stepped this obstacle by casting the Gomillion dispute as a Fifteenth 
Amendment voting rights case instead of a Fourteenth Amendment 
redistricting case. l41 This reasoning, however, persuaded neither Justice 
Whittaker nor later Court majorities. l42 
Two years after Gomillion, the landmark Baker v. Carr decision 
obviated the need for such judicial legerdemain. 143 In this case, the 
Court held that people who were underrepresented because of malap-
portionment had a cognizable claim under the Equal Protection 
Clause.144 The plaintiffs argued that they had been underrepresented 
because the Tennessee legislature had failed to reapportion districts in 
over sixty years, despite significant population changes during that 
period. l45 The Court reasoned that the plaintiffs had a right to vote 
free of arbitrary impairment by the state, and therefore had standing 
to sue under the Equal Protection Clause.146 
In the years following Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court issued a 
series of decisions that shaped voting rights jurisprudence under the 
Equal Protection Clause and formulated the "one person, one vote" 
standard. 147 The Court also began to use the Equal Protection Clause 
to adjudicate claims of racial vote dilution. 148 The Court moved further 
138 See 364 U.S. 339, 349 (1960) (Whittaker, J., concurring); see also Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 
2825-26. 
139 Gamillion, 364 U.S. at 349 (Whittaker, J., concurring). 
140 Id. at 346; Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946). 
141 See CLAUDE, supra note 71, at 152. 
142 Gamillion, 364 U.S. at 349 (Whittaker, J., concurring); see Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2825-26 
(1993). 
143 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
144 Id. at 209. 
145 Id. at 192. 
146 Id. at 208. 
147 See, e.g., Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969) (holding that Equal Protection Clause 
requires states to make good faith effort to achieve precise mathematical equality in population 
of each congressional district); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (holding that Equal 
Protection Clause requires both houses of a state legislature to be apportioned on a per capita 
basis); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963) (holding that county-unit system violates equal 
protection right to have votes be of equal weight). 
148 See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) (holding that multimember districts violate 
Equal Protection Clause where they tend to dilute the voting strength of minorities); Whitcomb 
v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971) (holding that evidence of discriminatory result or intent is 
necessary to prevail in equal protection claim of minority vote dilution). 
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away from its Fifteenth Amendment analysis in Gomillion149 and 
Wright,ISO until finally, in 1977, it held that some forms of racial gerry-
mandering did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. ISI 
In United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, the 
Court held that a redistricting authority could use racial criteria in 
drawing districts.152 In this case, a New York redistricting law split a 
Hasidic Jewish community in order to create nonwhite majorities in 
three state senate districts. ls3 Members of the Hasidic community sued 
the state, claiming that this race-based redistricting violated their Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendment rights. IS4 The Court held in favor of 
the state, ruling that the legislature could create minority-majority 
districts in order to ensure that these minorities were able to elect 
candidates of their choice. ISS 
Mter Congress amended the Voting Rights Act in 1982,IS6 the 
Court promulgated a three-pronged test for minority vote dilution 
cases. IS7 In Thornburg v. Gingles, the Court held that members of a 
minority group claiming vote dilution by redistricting had to prove 
three threshold conditions: (1) the minority group must be large 
enough and compact enough to constitute a majority in a single-mem-
ber district, (2) the minority group must be politically cohesive, and 
(3) the white majority must vote sufficiently as a bloc to usually be able 
to defeat the minority candidate. ls8 It was against this backdrop that 
the Supreme Court decided Shaw v. Reno.IS9 
149 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
15°376 U.S. 52 (1964). 
151 See United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (plurality 
opinion) [hereinafter UfO]. 
152Id. at 162 (plurality opinion). 
153ld. at 152 (plurality opinion). 
154Id. (plurality opinion). 
155Id. at 162, 158 (plurality opinion). The Court equated "candidates of their choice," which 
it drew from section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, with candidates of the same race as the voters. 
See id. at 165. The Court also held that it was reasonable for the state to draw a district with a 
supermajority (65%) of black citizens. Id. at 164. According to the Court, a 65% supermajority 
was needed for a black representative to be elected. Id. at 162. Assuming that white candidates 
need only just over 50% to win, the Court's racial logic suggests that 65 blacks are the equivalent 
of 50 whites, or that a black citizen is worth 77% of a white citizen. Although this is numerically 
greater than the three-fifths ratio in the original Constitution, it is by no means a valid standard 
of equality. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, d. 3 (before ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
156 Pub. L. No. 97-205,1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. (96 Stat.) 134 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 
to 1973bb-l (1993)). 
157 Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986). 
158Id. While the Tharnburgdecision was limited to multimember districts, id. at 46 n.12, the 
Court later extended this test to single-member districts. See Growe v. Emison, 113 S. Ct. 1075, 
1084 (1993). 
159 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2829, 2831-32 (1993). 
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IV. SHAW V. RENO 
In Shaw v. Reno, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs had 
successfully stated an equal protection claim when they alleged that a 
redistricting was so irregular that it could only be viewed as an effort 
to segregate voters by race.160 The district at issue, North Carolina's 
Twelfth Congressional District, was redrawn to contain a black major-
ity.161 To accomplish this goal, the legislature had drawn the district in 
an irregular, serpentine shape stretching for over 160 miles. 162 The 
Court held that District 12 was so irregularly shaped that it could only 
be seen as an attempt to segregate races for electoral purposes. 163 
A. The Facts of the Case 
Population changes revealed by the 1990 census entitled North 
Carolina to an additional seat in the United States House of Repre-
sentatives.164 When the legislature redrew the electoral map, only one 
district had a black majority.165 Because the population of North Caro-
lina was approximately twenty percent black,166 the U.S. Attorney Gen-
eral believed the legislature could have and should have drawn two 
districts with black majorities. 167 In response, the legislature enacted a 
revised plan that included two majority-black districts: District 1, in the 
eastern part of the state,168 and District 12, in the north-central region 
of the state. 169 The latter district, which was the subject of the Shaw 
claim, winds for about 160 miles along the Interstate 85 corridor.17O It 
slices across ten counties and divides numerous towns in its quest to 
include enough black neighborhoods to constitute a majority-black 
district.17! At times, southbound drivers on Interstate 85 are in a differ-
160 Id. at 2832. 
161ld. at 2820. 
162Id. at 2820-21. 
163Id. at 2832. 
164 Id. at 2819. 
165Id. 
166 Id. at 2820. This figure represents the voting-age population. The remainder is 78% white, 
1 % Native American, and 1 % Asian. Id. 
167Id. at 2820. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, which requires federal authorization for 
changes to a state's voting procedures, applied to 40 of North Carolina's 100 counties. Id.; 42 
U.S.C. § 1973c. 
168The Court described District 1, which was not at issue in Shaw, as a "Rorschach inkblot 
test." Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2820 (quoting Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 476 (E.D.N.C. 1992) 
(Voorhees, Cj., concurring in part and dissenting in part), rev'd sub nom. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. 
Ct. 2816 (1993)). 
169 Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2820. See map supra p. 338. 
170 Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2820-21. 
171 See id. at 2821. 
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ent district from northbound drivers; in the next county, these districts 
"change lanes."172 
The plaintiffs were five voters affected by this redistricting, two 
from the new Twelfth District and three from a neighboring district. 173 
They sued state and federal officials under both the Equal Protection 
Clause and the Fifteenth Amendment.174 The district court dismissed 
their action against the state officials for failure to state a constitutional 
claim.175 In a 2-1 decision, the district court held that the plaintiffs' 
Fifteenth Amendment claim was subsumed within their equal protec-
tion claim.176 The court then ruled that the decision in United Jewish 
Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey barred their equal protec-
tion claim.177 The court interpreted UJO as holding that a redistricting 
scheme only violates white voters' rights if it is "adopted with the 
purpose and effect of discriminating against white voters . . . on ac-
count of their race."17S The court reasoned that because the legisla-
ture's purpose was to comply with the Voting Rights Act, and because 
the plan did not lead to underrepresentation of white voters statewide, 
the plaintiffs had no equal protection claim.179 
In a separate opinion, Chief Judge Voorhees interpreted the UJO 
plurality as authorizing racial redistricting only when the state used 
traditional districting principles like compactness and contiguity. ISO Be-
cause the legislature had failed to follow these principles, there was 
sufficient probability of unlawful intent to defeat the motion to dis-
miss. lsl The plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court, which noted 
probable jurisdiction. ls2 
B. The Majority opinion 
The Supreme Court in Shaw reversed the district court's decision, 
holding that the plaintiffs had stated a cognizable equal protection 
172Id.; Political Pornography-II, WALL ST.]., Feb. 4, 1992, at A14. 
173 Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2821. 
174Shawv. Barr, 808 F. Supp. at 468. A three-judge panel of the district court heard the claim, 
basing jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 2284, and on 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 198B. 
Shaw, 808 F. Supp. at 463. 
175Id. at 468. The court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim against the federal officials because 
of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Voting Rights Act. Id. at 466-67. 
176Id. at 468-69. The court also found no support for the plaintiffs' claim that race-based 
gerrymandering is prohibited by Article I, §§ 2 and 4 of the Constitution, or by the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. 
177Id. at 472; see UJO, 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
178 Shaw, 808 F. Supp. at 472. 
179Id. at 472-73. 
180Id. at 475-77 (Voorhees, Cl, concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
181Id. at 477 (Voorhees, Cl, concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
182 113 S. Ct. 653 (1992). 
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claim.183 The majority opinion started by examining the background 
of voting rights in general and the various ways in which states have 
denied or abridged these rights in the past. 184 Mter the Fifteenth 
Amendment made it unconstitutional for a state to deny or abridge 
these rights based on race,185 states began to use various ostensibly 
race-neutral devices-such as racial gerrymandering-to circumvent 
the Amendment. 186 In response, the Court decided that such schemes 
gave rise to a claim under the Equal Protection Clause when they 
actually diluted minority voting strength.187 
In Shaw, the plaintiffs did not claim that they had suffered dilu-
tion of their voting strength.188 Instead, they argued that the redistrict-
ing was so irregular that it could only be viewed as an effort to segre-
gate voters by race.189 The Court agreed, holding that the Equal 
Protection Clause governed their claim.190 
To reach this conclusion, the Court first compared two different 
equal protection standards: one triggered by statutes that explicitly 
classifY by race, and the other by statutes that appear race-neutral but 
are "unexplainable on grounds other than race. "191 As examples of the 
latter variety, the Court reviewed cases decided under the Fifteenth 
Amendment instead of the Equal Protection Clause,192 such as Guinnl93 
and Gomillion. 194 The Court noted thatJustice Whittaker's concurrence 
in Gomillion suggested that the Equal Protection Clause was more 
appropriate to the case than was the Fifteenth Amendment. 195 The 
Court also noted that it had relied on Gomillion in subsequent Four-
183 Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2832 (1993). Justice O'Connor wrote for the majority in 
the 5-4 decision, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. 
Id. at 2819. 
184 Id. at 2822-23. 
185 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, supra note 15. 
186 Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2822-23. 
187Id. at 2823 (citing Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 616--17 (1982) and White v. Regester, 
412 U.S. 755, 765-66 (1973)). Congress also responded by requiring only the showing of discrimi-
natory result in making a minority vote dilution claim under the Voting Rights Act. Shaw, 113 S. 
Ct. at 2823; see 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1993); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43-44 (1986). 
188113 S. Ct. at 2824. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. 
IgiId. at 2825 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan HollS. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 
266 (1977)). 
192Id. at 2825-26. 
193 Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915); see supra notes 98-104 and accompanying 
text. 
194 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); see supra notes 108-13 and accompanying 
text. 
195 Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2826; Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 349 (Whittaker, J., concurring). 
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teenth Amendment cases.196 The Shaw majority concluded that Gomil-
lion therefore stood for the principle that redistricting for the purpose 
of segregating voters by race required close scrutiny under the Equal 
Protection Clause.197 
The Court then considered the difficulties of determining 
whether a redistricting plan purposefully segregated voters by race. 19S 
In Wright v. Rockefeller,199 for example, each Justice agreed that the 
plaintiffs had a constitutional claim in alleging that the redistricting 
had segregated voters by race.200 The Justices disagreed, however, on 
whether the plaintiffs had proven their claim; the majority felt that the 
plaintiffs had failed to establish that the districts were actually drawn 
along racial lines, while the dissenters maintained that no other expla-
nation was possible.201 The Shaw Court concluded that the difficulty in 
proving a racial gerrymander does not remove it from equal protection 
scrutiny.202 Furthermore, the Court suggested that in some instances, 
proving an unlawful racial gerrymander would not be difficult. 203 If a 
redrawn district was so irregular that it could not be explained as 
anything other than an attempt to segregate voters, a court could find 
that it was an unlawful racial gerrymander.204 The Court concluded that 
"appearances do matter" in redistricting cases; districts that concen-
trate minorities are suspect when legislatures draw them without re-
gard to traditional principles of compactness, contiguity, and respect 
for political subdivisions.205 
The Court next discussed the equal protection standard appropri-
ate to racial gerrymandering cases.206 In cases where state legislation 
expressly distinguishes among citizens by race, the Clause requires that 
the law be "narrowly tailored to further a compelling government 
interest."207 The Court stated that this standard also applies to statutes 
that are ostensibly race neutral but that cannot be explained on other 
than racial grounds.20s In other vote dilution cases, however, the Court 
196 Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2826; see, e.g., Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149 (1971). 
197 113 S. Ct. at 2826. 
198Id. 
199 376 U.S. 52 (1964); see supra notes 114-20 and accompanying text. 
200 Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2826; see Wright, 376 U.S. at 56; id. at 58 (Harlan, j., concurring); id. 
at 59-62 (Douglas, j., dissenting). 
201 Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2826; see Wright, 376 U.S. at 56-58; id. at 59 (Douglas, j., dissenting). 
202 113 S. Ct. at 2826. 
203Id. 
204Id. (citing Gomillion, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960)). 
205Id. at 2827. 
206Id. at 2828-30. 
207Id. at 2825. 
208 [d. 
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has applied a different standard: the plaintiffs had to prove that "the 
challenged practice has the purpose and effect of diluting a racial 
group's voting strength."209 The Shaw majority distinguished these 
cases by noting that at-large and multimember voting schemes do not 
classifY voters by race.210 ClassifYing citizens by race warrants a different 
equal protection analysis because it threatens special harms:211 
It reinforces the perception that members of the same racial 
group-regardless of their age, education, economic status, 
or the community in which the [y] live-think alike, share the 
same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates 
at the polls. . .. When a district obviously is created solely 
to effectuate the perceived common interests of one racial 
group, elected officials are more likely to believe that their 
primary obligation is to represent only the members of that 
group, rather than their constituency as a whole.212 
The Shaw majority also distinguished this case from UjO,213 which 
it believed both the district court and the dissenters had misinter-
preted.214 The plaintiffs in UjO claimed that the redistricting at issue 
had diluted their voting strength.215 Unlike the Shaw plaintiffs, the UjO 
plaintiffs did not allege that the plan was so irregular that it could only 
be understood as an attempt to segregate voters by race.216 
Finally, the Shaw Court held that satisfaction of Voting Rights Act 
requirements did not obviate the need for constitutional scrutiny of 
the redistricting plan.217 The Court based this conclusion on section 5 
of the Act and on previous caselaw.218 The defendant state officials 
209 /d. at 2828; see, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (at-large voting system); City of 
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (same); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) (multimem-
ber districts); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971) (same). 
210 113 S. Ct. at 2828. 
211 ld. 
2121d. at 2827. The majority in Shaw disagreed sharply with the dissenters, who did not make 
this distinction. ld. at 2828; if. Uf. at 2840 (White,]., dissenting); id. at 2847-48 (Souter,]., 
dissenting) . 
213 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
214 Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2829; see Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. at 472-73; Shawv. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 
at 2837-38 (White,]., dissenting); id. at 2847-48 (Souter,]., dissenting). 
215 See UJO, 430 U.S. at 152 (plurality opinion). 
216 See Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2829; UJO, 430 U.S. at 152 (plurality opinion). 
217 Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2831. 
218Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1993) (neither a declaratory judgment by the District Court 
for the District of Columbia nor preclearance by the Attorney General "shall bar a subsequent 
action to enjoin enforcement" of new voting procedure); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 
544, 549-50 (1969) (private parties may enjoin enforcement of plan after preclearance in 
"traditional suits attacking its constitutionality"). 
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contended that the Act required the plan to avoid dilution of black 
voting strength, but the Court declined to resolve this issue.21g Instead, 
the Court limited its holding to the recognition of the plaintiffs' claim 
that the redistricting was so irregular that it could only be viewed as 
an effort to segregate voters by race. 220 This claim, the Court con-
cluded, warranted the same close judicial scrutiny appropriate to other 
racial classifications.221 
C. The Dissenting Opinions 
The four remaining Justices each filed dissenting opinions.222 
While each dissenter agreed that the Equal Protection Clause was the 
proper tool for analyzing racial gerrymandering cases, they all rejected 
the majority's application of a standard that differed from the one used 
in other vote dilution cases.223 Justice White began his opinion by 
stating that the Court had previously considered two different types of 
voting rights claims that are cognizable under the Equal Protection 
Clause.224 The first type arises from the outright deprivation of voting 
rights.225 Because this condition was not found in the Shaw case,Justice 
White declined to examine it further. 226 The second type of voting 
rights claim involves practices that diminish the political influence of 
particular groups.227 To prove this type of claim, the plaintiffs must 
show that the challenged action has both the purpose and the effect 
of diminishing their influence. 228 Justice White then argued that racial 
gerrymandering claims belong to this latter type of claim.229 
According to Justice White, this argument found support in the 
UfO decision.230 Moreover, he asserted that the facts of this case were 
219 Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2831. 
220 [d. at 2832. 
221 [d. 
222 [d. at 2819; id. at 2834 (White,]., dissenting); id. at 2843 (Blackmun,]., dissenting); id. 
(Stevens,]., dissenting); id. at 2845 (Souter,]., dissenting). In addition to filing their own dissents, 
Justices Blackmun and Stevens also joined Justice White's dissent. [d. at 2834 (White,]., dissent-
ing). 
223 [d. at 2834 (White,]., dissenting); id. at 2843 (Blackmun,]., dissenting); id. (Stevens,]., 
dissenting); id. at 2845 (Souter,]., dissenting). 
224 [d. at 2834 (White,]., dissenting). 
225 [d. (White,]., dissenting); see, e.g., Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (grandfa-
ther clause used to disenfranchise black voters). 
226 113 S. Ct. at 2834 (White,]., dissenting). 
227 [d. (White,]., dissenting); see, e.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (plaintiffs 
claimed that at-large voting system diminished their political influence). 
228 Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2834 (White,]., dissenting). 
229 [d. at 2834-36 (White,]., dissenting). 
230 [d. at 2837 (White,]., dissenting); see UfO, 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
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analogous to the facts in UfO and that the Court should have followed 
the reasoning of that case.231 Justice White argued that because North 
Carolina did not seek to create District 12 for the purpose of dimin-
ishing white voters' political influence, the plaintiffs did not have a 
vote dilution claim under the Equal Protection Clause.232 
Justice White also noted that Gomillion, upon which the majority 
relied for its equal protection analysis, involved a voters' rights depri-
vation claim under the Fifteenth Amendment.233 This distinction evis-
cerated the precedential value that the majority ascribed to it. 234Justice 
White argued that Gomillion did not involve the segregation of a racial 
group for voting purposes; instead, the case had stemmed from an 
effort to deprive black voters of ''valuable municipal services. "235 Simi-
larly, in Shaw, "no racial group can be said to have been 'segregated' 
"236 
Justices Blackmun and Stevens filed considerably shorter dissents 
that primarily echoed Justice White's opinion.237 Justice Souter issued 
a more substantial dissent, arguing that race-based redistricting did not 
always constitute vote dilution.238 He then explained why vote dilution 
cases deserve a more lenient equal protection scrutiny, arguing that 
race is a legitimate consideration in redistricting under the Voting 
Rights ACt.239 Justice Souter concluded by criticizing the majority for 
creating a new cause of action for racial gerrymandering claims.240 
V. APPLYING THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT TO RACIAL 
GERRYMANDERING 
While the Shaw Court vehemently decried racial gerrymandering 
as a form of "political apartheid,"241 the Court failed to promulgate a 
workable means for removing this practice from our political system. 
The Court opened a Pandora's box when it insisted that the Equal 
Protection Clause was a better tool than the Fifteenth Amendment for 
231 113 S. Ct. at 2834 (White, j., dissenting); UJO, 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (plurality opinion) 
(rejecting claim that the creation of a majority-minority district violated the Constitution). 
232 Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2838 (White, j., dissenting). 
233 Id. at 2839 (White, j., dissenting); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (holding 
that redrawing of city boundaries segregated voters by race in violation of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment); see supra notes 108-13 and accompanying text. 
234 Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2839 (White, j., dissenting). 
235Id. at 2838-39 (White, j., dissenting). 
236 Id. at 2840 n.7 (White,j., dissenting). 
237Id. at 2843 (Blackmun,j., dissenting); id. (Stevens,j., dissenting). 
238 Id. at 2845-46 (Souter,j., dissenting). 
239 Id. at 2846-48 (Souter,j., dissenting). 
240 Id. at 2848-49 (Souter,j., dissenting). 
241Id. at 2827. 
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adjudicating racial gerrymandering claims.242 To an already compli-
cated process, the Shaw decision added further questions such as which 
equal protection standard a court should use and how the standard 
should be applied. The Court also had to synthesize conflicting prior 
opinions. Had the Court chosen to consider the plaintiffs' Fifteenth 
Amendment claim instead, these problems and questions would have 
become moot. 
Contrary to Justice Souter's claims,243 the majority did not create 
a new cause of action under the Equal Protection Clause for racial 
gerrymandering.244 The Court instead noted that there are two differ-
ent equal protection standards for voting rights cases: one for statutes 
based on racial classification, and the other for voter dilution cases.245 
The former includes not only laws that explicitly classifY by race, but 
also classifications that are ostensibly race neutral but that can only be 
explained as being racially motivated.246 The Shaw majority held that 
redistricting plans that are so irregular that they can only be viewed as 
attempts to segregate voters fall into the racial classification category.247 
As with explicitly race-based statutes, these gerrymanders warrant close 
judicial scrutiny.248 The Court's holding distinguished racial gerryman-
dering from other vote dilution claims where the plaintiffs must prove 
both a discriminatory purpose and a result of minority voting strength 
dilution.249 These other claims concern practices that do not classify 
voters on the basis of race, such as at-large voting systems or multimem-
ber districts.250 Rather than creating a new equal protection standard 
for racial gerrymandering cases,251 the Court simply shifted racial ger-
rymandering claims from the voter dilution category to the racial 
classification category. 
In his dissent, Justice White uncovered the fundamental flaw in 
the Court's reasoning: that the majority incorrectly relied on Gomillion 
for its equal protection analysis.252Justice White pointed out that Gomil-
lion concerned a claim brought under the Fifteenth Amendment, 
242 See id. at 2826. 
2431d. at 2848 (Souter, j., dissenting). 
244 See id. at 2824-25. 
2451d. at 2824. 
2461d. at 2824-25. 
2471d. at 2825. 
2481d. 
2491d. at 2828. 
250ld.; see, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (at-large voting system); City of Mobile 
v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (same); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) (multimember 
districts); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971) (same). 
251 See Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2848 (Souter, j., dissenting). 
252 See id. at 2839 (White, j., dissenting); id. at 2825-26 (citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 
U.S. 339 (1960)). 
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rather than under the Equal Protection Clause.253 While admitting that 
the Gomillion Court had decided the case on Fifteenth Amendment 
grounds, the Shaw majority noted that the concurring opinion would 
have preferred to use the Fourteenth Amendment to adjudicate the 
claim.254 The Shaw Court also cited other Fourteenth Amendment 
decisions that had relied on the Gomillion holding.255 Making a consid-
erable logical leap, the majority concluded that "Gomillion thus sup-
ports [the plaintiffs'] contention that district lines obviously drawn for 
the purpose of separating voters by race require careful scrutiny under 
the Equal Protection Clause .... "256 This conclusion is not supported 
by the Gomillion decision. 257 
Perhaps the Court's confusion stemmed from the Gomillion opin-
ion itself. Justice Frankfurter described the plaintiffs' claim in Gomil-
lion as one that alleged a denial of the right to vote under the Fifteenth 
Amendment:258 'The result of the Act is to deprive the Negro petition-
ers discriminatorily of the benefits of residence in Tuskegee, including, 
inter alia, the right to vote in municipal elections."259 But the Fifteenth 
Amendment covers more than just the denial of the right to vote. "The 
right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or 
abridged . .. on account of race .... "260 The word "abridge" is defined 
as "to diminish (as a right) by reducing."26! Had the Gomillion Court 
held that the racial gerrymander abridged the voting rights of black 
citizens, the Court's Fifteenth Amendment analysis may then have 
been more persuasive. 
As noted above,262 gerrymandering abridges the rights of the af-
fected voters by removing a portion of their ability to select the repre-
sentatives of their choice.263 When a legislature redraws districts along 
253 See id. at 2839 (White,]., dissenting); Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 341; see also supra notes 108-13 
and accompanying text. 
254 Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2825-26; Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 341; id. at 349 (Whittaker,]., concur-
ring). 
255 Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2826. 
256Id. 
257 See Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 346 (holding that redrawing of city boundaries along racial lines 
violated the Fifteenth Amendment). But see id. at 349 (Whittaker,]., concurring) ("It seems to 
me that the decision should be rested not on the Fifteenth Amendment, but rather on the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution."). 
258 Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 340,341,347. 
259Id. at 341. 
260 U.S. CaNST. amend XV, § 1 (emphasis added); see supra note 15. 
261 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 32, at 6. Congress did 
not discuss the specific meaning of the term during its consideration of the Amendment. 
MATHEWS, supra note 79, at 38. 
262 See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text. 
263 See Polsby & Popper, supra note 6, at 304; see also Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 347. But see 
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racial lines, it abridges the rights of voters based on their race.264 As 
the Court declared in Reynolds v. Sims, "the right of suffrage can be 
denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote 
just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the 
franchise. "265 
The Equal Protection Clause overlaps the Fifteenth Amendment 
in that both provisions guarantee equal treatment of citizens based on 
race.266 They are not, however, interchangeable; if they were, there 
would have been no need to pass the Fifteenth Amendment after the 
Fourteenth Amendment had been ratified.267 While the Fourteenth 
Amendment was passed for the purpose of federalizing civil rights,268 
the Fifteenth was created with the much narrower purpose of guaran-
teeing suffrage to all men regardless of race.269 Before subsuming 
Fifteenth Amendment claims into equal protection claims,270 a court 
should first consider that the Fifteenth Amendment was created spe-
cifically to protect the right to vote from racially discriminatory prac-
tices.271 
Using the Fifteenth Amendment to adjudicate racial gerryman-
dering claims would obviate the need to juggle the different standards 
of equal protection analysis.272 Instead of having to distinguish between 
race classification claims and voter dilution claims, a court would only 
need to determine whether the plaintiffs' voting rights were "denied 
or abridged ... on account of race .... "273 Plaintiffs would not be 
MATHEWS, supra note 79, at 38. "The right to vote was held [by some] to be a unit, as indivisible 
and incapable of abridgement as a mathematical point A man must possess the right to vote 
either in the entirety or not at all." [d. (citing CaNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3039 (1866) 
(remarks of Senator Howard of Michigan on § 2 of Fourteenth Amendment». This position was 
in the minority. See id. 
264 See U.S. CaNST. amend. XV, § 1, supra note 15; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964). 
265 377 U.S. at 555. 
266 Compare U.S. CaNST. amend. XIV, § 1, supra note 15 ("nor shall any State ... deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws") with U.S. CaNST. amend. XV, 
§ 1, supra note 15 (,The right of citizens ... to vote shall not be denied or abridged ... on 
account of race .... "). In fact, the origins of the Fifteenth Amendment lay partly in the 
Fourteenth Amendment. See Stephenson, supra note 69, at 49. 
267 See Stephenson, supra note 69, at 50. 
268 See CLAUDE, supra note 71, at 45; Stephenson, supra note 69, at 48-49. 
269 See GILLETTE, supra note 78, at 46; Stephenson, supra note 69, at 50. 
270 See Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2822 (1993); Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 468-69 
(E.n.N.C. 1992), rev'd sub nom. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993). 
271 See Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 361 (1915) (Fifteenth Amendment was "adopted 
to destroy" conditions preventing equality of suffrage); MATHEWS, supra note 79, at 20-21; 
Stephenson, supra note 69, at 50-51. 
272 See Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2823, 2824-25; id. at 2834 (White,]., dissenting). 
273U.S. CaNST. amend. XV, § 1; see supra note 15. 
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required to show discriminatory intent; they could meet their burden 
of proof by showing that the statute, though ostensibly race neutral, 
could not be explained on grounds other than race.274 
Applying the Fifteenth Amendment to the facts in Shaw v. Reno 
would have returned the same result without the complicated holding. 
The plaintiffs alleged that their Fifteenth Amendment right to vote 
had been abridged by the North Carolina legislature when it redrew 
the congressional districts along racial line s. 275 In creating District 12, 
the legislature packed black voters from ten counties into one snake-
like district in order to create a black majority.276 By taking away a 
portion of the voters' ability to select their representatives, the legisla-
ture abridged their right to vote.277 Because the North Carolina legis-
lature drew this redistricting along racial lines, the legislature abridged 
the plaintiffs' right to vote on account of race, violating the express 
language of the Fifteenth Amendment.278 Furthermore, by removing 
black voters from the surrounding districts and packing them into 
District 12, the legislature limited the amount of influence that these 
274 See Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2825; Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960); Guinn, 238 
U.S. at 363. But see City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 65 (1980) (plurality opinion). The 
Mobile Court, contradicting decades of precedent, held that the Fifteenth Amendment required 
a showing of discriminatory intent to find a violation. Id.; see supra notes 129-37 and accompa-
nying text. The Supreme Court has yet to set aside the Mobile plurality's opinion concerning the 
Fifteenth Amendment. See Jordan, supra note 128, at 392 & nn.6-7. Because the opinion failed 
to get a majority of five Justices, however, it lacks precedential weight. See Hertz v. Woodman, 218 
U.S. 205, 213 (1910). The Court in Hertz stated: 
Id. 
Under the principles of this court ... an affirmance by an equally divided court is 
between the parties a conclusive determination and adjudication of the matter 
adjudged, but the principles of law involved not having been agreed upon by a 
majority of the court sitting prevents this case from becoming an authority for the 
determination of other cases, either in this or in inferior courts. 
275 Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 469 (E.D.N.C. 1992), rev'd sub nom. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. 
Ct. 2816 (1993). 
276 Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2820-21; see Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149, 1155 (1993); supra 
notes 41-44 and accompanying text. 
277 See Polsby & Popper, supra note 6, at 304. 
278 See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1, supra note 15. Contrary to Justice White's opinion, it is 
irrelevant that white voters are still proportionally represented statewide. See Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 
2838 (White, J., dissenting). The white voters of District 12 are not represented by the white 
representatives of the other districts, as these representatives are not accountable to the District 
12 voters. Similarly, black voters in the ten white-majority districts are not represented by the 
black representatives in Districts 12 and 1. It does not matter whether there is the same proportion 
of black representatives as there are black voters. The important issue in this case is whether the 
legislature has abridged the power of voters-both black and white-to select the representatives 
of their choice. As this Note has argued, the legislature has used race to abridge the power of 
voters to select their representatives. See supra notes 260-65 and accompanying text. 
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voters could wield in Congress.279 Where they might have influenced 
the election outcomes in several districts, they can now influence the 
result only in the Twelfth.280 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The North Carolina legislature violated the Fifteenth Amendment 
rights of all the voters affected by the racial gerrymander-black and 
white. Using the Fifteenth Amendment to analyze racial gerrymander-
ing claims would end the confusion of different equal protection 
standards and replace it with a simple solution that would end the 
harms created by racially discriminatory redistricting. By treating racial 
gerrymandering as an unconstitutional abridgement of the right to 
vote, the Court would further the principles of racial equality set forth 
by the Framers of the Fifteenth Amendment. 
279 See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text. 
280 See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text. 

